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Constitutional Concern, Membership, and Race 
Sarah Krakoff 
INTRODUCTION 
American Indian Tribes in the United States have a unique legal and 
political status shaped by fluctuating federal policies and the over-arching 
history of this country’s brand of settler-colonialism.1  One of the several 
legacies of this history is that federally recognized tribes have membership 
rules that diverge significantly from typical state or national citizenship 
criteria.  These rules and their history are poorly understood by judges and 
members of the public, leading to misunderstandings about the “racial” 
status of tribes and Indian people, and on occasion to incoherent and 
damaging decisions on a range of Indian law issues.  This article, which is 
part of a larger project on tribes, sovereignty, and race, will discuss the 
history of Florida’s tribes, their road from pre-contact independent peoples 
to federally recognized tribes, and their contemporary membership criteria 
in order to shed light on the inextricably political nature of race, 
membership, and sovereignty in the American Indian context.2 
There are 566 American Indian tribes that are federally recognized, 
meaning that they have a direct government-to-government relationship 
with the United States.3 One of the requirements for federal recognition, 
both historical and contemporary, is descent from an historical Indian tribe 
or group of tribes.4  To achieve recognition today, tribes must also 
demonstrate that most of their members come from a “distinct 
community.”5  Further, all tribes are required to have membership criteria.6  
 
      Professor and Schaden Chair of Experiential Learning, University of Colorado Law School.  I 
am grateful to Michael Daugherty for research assistance. 
1  Settler colonial societies are those where non-indigenous people came to stay and quickly 
outnumbered the indigenous inhabitants, thus making elimination of indigenous claims to territory the 
primary object of settler laws and policies.  See PATRICK WOLFE, SETTLER COLONIALISM AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF ANTHROPOLOGY 1-2 (1999); Patrick Wolfe, Land, Labor, and Difference: 
Elementary Structures of Race, 106 AM. HIST. REV. 866, 867-68 (2001). 
2  For the other articles related to this project, see Sarah Krakoff, Race, Membership and Tribal 
Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041 (2012) [hereinafter Inextricably Political]; Settler Colonialism and 
Reclamation: Where American Indian Law and Natural Resources Law Meet, 24 COLO. NAT. 
RESOURCES, ENERGY & ENVTL. L. REV. 261 (2013). 
3  See Indian Tribal Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the U.S. Bureau of 
Indian Affairs, 79 Fed. Reg., no. 19, 4748 (Jan. 29, 2014). 
4  See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e). 
5  See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(b). 
6  See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(d). 
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While in theory tribes’ present-day membership criteria do not have to 
include lineage or descent requirements, a long and complicated history, 
which included many instances of coercion by the Federal Government, has 
resulted in virtually all tribes requiring some form of ancestral or familial 
tie to be a member.7  Taking these requirements together, all federally 
recognized tribes are required by federal and tribal law to show that their 
members have some shared ancestry with pre-contact indigenous peoples.8  
At the same time, today’s federally recognized tribes are composed of 
members whose ethnic, racial, linguistic, and cultural heritage is quite 
diverse.9  Tribes’ political status today seldom (if ever) tracks their pre-
contact group identity seamlessly.  Some tribes were compelled to join 
together as a single federally-recognized entity, while others were scattered 
and dispersed irrespective of their historical unity.10  The legal category 
“federally recognized tribe” is therefore political in several senses, and the 
membership rules for such tribes are likewise both products and expressions 
of politics, even while they also include (indeed must include) lineal 
descent or other ancestry requirements. 
In Morton v. Mancari, the Supreme Court held that federal 
classifications that further the unique government-to-government 
relationship with American Indian tribes should not be subject to 
heightened scrutiny.11  Mancari upheld an employment preference for tribal 
members at the Bureau of Indian Affairs, noting along the way that the 
preference was conferred on Indians who were members of a tribe, and not 
on all people who could claim to be Indian as a racial or ethnic matter.  The 
Court therefore described the classification as political rather than racial for 
the purpose of its analysis.12  While some courts and commentators have 
made much of the “political versus racial or ethnic” distinction, the better 
reading of Mancari is that classifications that recognize the unique status 
and rights of tribes, even if they necessarily include aspects of lineage and 
descent, should generally be upheld.  As the leading American Indian law 
treatise states, “[a] sound reading of Morton v. Mancari would 
acknowledge that even though ancestry may figure into some Indian 
classifications, ultimately the most important inquiry is whether the law can 
 
7  See, e.g., Inextricably Political, supra note 2; Paul Spruhan, A Legal History of Blood Quantum 
in Federal Indian Law to 1935, 51 S.D. L. REV. 1 (2006); Kirsty Gover, Genealogy as Continuity: 
Explaining the Growing Tribal Preference for Descent Rules in Membership Governance in the United 
States, 33 AM. IND. L. REV. 243 (2008-09). 
8  See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1081-82.  It is also possible that connection to a pre-
contact group is a constitutional requirement for tribal recognition. 
9  See id. at 1103. 
10 See id. at 1118. 
11 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). 
12 See id. at 553 n.24. 
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be justified as fulfilling ‘Congress’ unique obligation toward the Indians.”13 
Recently, however, the Supreme Court and some lower federal courts 
have expressed concern about laws that acknowledge the distinct political 
and legal status of American Indian tribes and tribal members.14  In 
Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Court interpreted the Indian Child 
Welfare Act (ICWA) narrowly to exclude its application to a case involving 
the adoption of a child who, the Court noted repeatedly, was “classified as 
an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee.”15  The parties opposing 
application of the ICWA had pressed an equal protection argument.16  
While the Court concluded that the ICWA’s “plain text” controlled the 
outcome and therefore did not reach the equal protection issue, the Court 
was nonetheless troubled by the fact that this child’s fate could differ from 
that of other prospective adoptive children because of what the Court 
perceived to be her scant blood tie to an Indian tribe.17  The Court therefore 
mentioned, near the end of its opinion, that excluding the case from the 
ICWA’s requirements avoided “equal protection concerns.”18  Under 
Mancari’s approach, however, there are no such concerns.  The child in 
Adoptive Couple was eligible for membership in the Cherokee Nation 
according to the Nation’s citizenship rules, which require direct descent 
from a member of the Cherokee rolls taken during a federal census from 
1899-1906.  Therefore while the Court described the child as “1.2% 
Cherokee,” it might instead have described her as “eligible to be a Cherokee 
citizen,” which, had she been able to enroll, would have made her “100% 
Cherokee” in the only sense with any relevance to the opinion.  The ICWA 
distinguishes between members of tribes and nonmembers, not people who 
are racially Indian or not.  Further, there is no doubt that the ICWA was 
passed in furtherance of Congress’s unique obligation to American Indian 
tribes, so under the Mancari framework this was an easy case.19 
The Court’s tendency to conflate the categories of race, lineage, and 
tribal membership, and to see all of those classifications as troubling 
regardless of the context or purposes, has been developing over time.20  In 
 
13 COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 14.03[2][b] at 927 (Nell Jessup Newton et 
al.  eds., 2005). 
14 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013); KG Urban Enters., LLC, v. Patrick, 
693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012); Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657 (9th Cir. 1997). 
15 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556, 2559, 2565. 
16 See Response of Guardian Ad Litem in Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Adoptive 
Couple v. Baby Girl, No. 12-399, 2012 WL 5209997, at *10 (Oct. 22, 2012). 
17 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2565. 
18 See id. at 2565. 
19 See infra Part I. A. (describing history and purposes of the ICWA). 
20 This trend is part of a larger one, in which the Court subjects all government classifications, 
even those designed to achieve substantive racial and ethnic equality, to the Court’s highest level of 
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Rice v. Cayetano, the Court expressed the view that a lineage requirement 
was simply a “proxy for race” when it struck down a state voting law on the 
ground that it violated the Fifteenth Amendment.21  While Rice did not 
involve a federal law affecting a recognized American Indian tribe, the 
Court’s views about lineage and race, evident in both Rice and Adoptive 
Couple, do not augur well for future cases involving such challenges.  As 
the Court moves, in general, toward an increasingly ahistorical and 
genealogical approach to racial classifications, it sows confusion about 
tribes, their status, and their interests, and obscures the law’s historical role 
in racializing and subordinating American Indians as well as other groups.22  
The Court’s purportedly “color-blind” approach risks reinscribing the 
various forms of racial subordination that contemporary laws have aimed to 
reverse. 
This Article wades into this difficult terrain.  After a review of equal 
protection law, the Article will recount, in necessarily cursory fashion, the 
story of how the Seminole Tribe of Indians of Florida and the Miccosukee 
Tribe of Florida evolved from pre-contact sovereign peoples to their current 
status as federally recognized tribes.  Like many tribes, the Seminole and 
Miccosukee survived a violent history replete with attempts to eliminate 
them.  Both tribes descend from the Creek and other indigenous peoples, 
and each tribe also has members who reflect a range of other ethnic, racial, 
and cultural backgrounds.  Their histories reveal how race was used to 
marginalize and subordinate tribes, and also how distinct political groups 
were carved out of larger ethnic, linguistic, and cultural peoples.  The 
Article will then consider the Seminole and Miccosukee’s current 
membership rules in order to reflect on the role of tribal membership 
criteria more generally.  Whether lineal descent requirements, as in the case 
of the Cherokee Nation, or quarter or more ancestry requirements, as at 
Seminole and Miccosukee respectively, tribal membership criteria are 
political expressions of a people trying to maintain an indigenous cultural 
identity against the backdrop of histories that reflected the dominant, if 
inconsistent, goal of wiping them out.  The Article ends by considering how 
these histories should influence our views of federal equal protection 
challenges to laws that further tribal political independence.  First, tribal 
 
scrutiny.  Reva Siegel has described this as the shift from an antisubordination to an anticlassification 
approach to equal protection.  See Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and 
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1473 
(2004). 
21 Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514, 519-20 (2000). 
22 See Siegel, supra note 20.  For more on the socio-legal construction of race generally, see IAN 
F.  HANEY LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE (rev. ed. 2006) (analyzing 
legal construction of racial hierarchies in the United States); MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, 
RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1994). 
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membership criteria should be seen in their proper light, as expressions of 
tribal political identity as well as mandatory federal requirements for 
separate political status.  Second, and following from that, courts should 
continue to hew to the holding in Morton v. Mancari,23 upholding laws that 
are rooted in the political relationship between tribes and the Federal 
Government and that further the government’s unique obligations to tribes. 
I.  EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE COURT’S RECENT BOUT OF 
“CONSTITUTIONAL CONCERN” 
A.  Constitutional Concern and Baby Veronica 
In 2013, the Supreme Court decided Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, a 
case involving the custody of a young child who spent the first two years of 
her life with white adoptive parents and the next two years with her 
biological father, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation of 
Oklahoma.24  The fate of Baby Veronica, as she became known in the press, 
captivated national attention as well as the support of former U.S.  Solicitor 
Paul Clement, who has made no secret of his interests in reversing Morton 
v. Mancari and limiting federal laws that recognize American Indian tribal 
rights.25  The case proved to be a good vehicle to challenge aspects of the 
Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),26 a federal law that imposes distinct 
procedural and substantive requirements on the adoption and foster care 
placement of American Indian children, because the Act’s application to 
Baby Veronica resulted in the tearful scene of her being taken away from 
her adoptive parents at the age of two by a father whom she had never met.  
In an opinion that was clearly swayed by the adoptive parents’ narrative of 
the story, the Supreme Court held that the ICWA did not apply to Baby 
Veronica’s adoption.27  This set in motion the second wrenching change of 
custody in the girl’s short life, which was carried out with dispatch when 
the adoptive parents took her from her Cherokee father back to a home that 
it is likely she barely recalled. 
The Indian Child Welfare Act was passed in 1978 in response to 
overwhelming evidence that state and private child welfare workers and 
adoption agencies were removing American Indian children from their 
families at shocking rates.28  The removals were often based on biases or 
 
23 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
24 Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
25 See Gregory Smith & Carolyn Mayhew, Apocalypse Now: The Unrelenting Assault on Morton 
v. Mancari, 60 FED. LAWYER 47, 48, 55 (2013). 
26 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, et seq. 
27 See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552. 
28 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-1386, at 9 (1978); S. REP. NO. 95-597, at 11-13 (1977); see also COHEN, 
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misunderstandings about American Indian family structures and norms, and 
were sufficiently widespread to create existential threats to some tribes.  
The ICWA put in place a number of procedural and substantive 
requirements that mandate Tribal Court jurisdiction in some cases; allow 
tribal participation in state proceedings in others; and impose different 
standards for removal, placement, and termination of parental rights.29  The 
ICWA treats American Indian children differently from other children 
based on their political status as members, or potential members, of 
federally recognized tribes.30  Without this distinct treatment, the statute 
would have no effect or purpose.  The ICWA was designed to address the 
fundamental problem (by many accounts a continuing one)31 of 
discriminatory interference in the families of American Indian tribal 
members.  The solution was to bolster legal protections for those families 
based on their status as members of sovereign nations with their own legal 
systems, and to recognize rights in both the family members and the tribes 
to enforce the law.32 
Like all laws, the ICWA is neither perfectly enforced nor perfectly 
crafted.  In terms of enforcement, many state courts initially resisted its 
application, and state child welfare workers and private adoption agencies 
were slow to get the news that their practices had to change.  For many 
lawyers and judges, the overlay of federal law onto their typically state-law-
only practices was odd and unfamiliar.  Delay in identifying children as 
Indian, notifying tribes, and applying the ICWA’s protective measures often 
resulted in situations where courts then strained to avoid the ICWA’s 
application at all.33  In terms of the legislation itself, there are some gaps in 
terms of when and how tribes have to be notified, again contributing to 
delay and consequent resistance to enforcement.34  Despite the fact that in 
the vast majority of cases, the ICWA is applied without incident to the 
benefit of Indian children, their families, their tribes, and all other parties 
involved,35 the problems and gaps lead to anguished situations that tend to 
 
supra note 13, at § 11.01[2], 821-25. 
29 See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, et seq.; COHEN, supra note 13, at §§ 11.02-11.06, 826-48 (reviewing 
provisions of the ICWA). 
30 See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4), et seq. 
31 See, e.g., Oglala Sioux Tribe v. Hunnik, No. 13-5020-JLV, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10162 
(S.D. Jan. 28, 2014) (class action lawsuit brought by tribes alleging widespread violations of the ICWA 
in the state of South Dakota). 
32 See COHEN, supra note 13, at § 11.01[2], 824. 
33 See id. at § 11.05[2], 844-45 (describing misuses of “good cause” exception to the ICWA’s 
placement preferences); § 11.07, 852-55 (describing judge-made doctrine, often called the “existing 
Indian family doctrine” employed to avoid application of the ICWA). 
34 See 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (requiring notice to tribe only in involuntary proceedings). 
35 See, e.g., B.J. JONES ET AL., INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT: A PILOT STUDY OF COMPLIANCE IN 
NORTH DAKOTA (2000). 
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grab all of the headlines.  Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl was such a case. 
Baby Veronica’s birth mother and father were engaged but living apart 
when the birth mother informed the father she was pregnant.  The birth 
father urged the birth mother to move up their wedding plans.  Apparently 
she refused and their relations deteriorated from there.36  While the U.S.  
Supreme Court opinion did not emphasize some of the following facts, the 
South Carolina State Supreme Court, which affirmed a lower court decision 
to award custody to the Cherokee father, included them in its opinion.  
First, although the birth mother knew that the father was an enrolled 
member of the Cherokee Nation and testified that she made his heritage 
known to the adoptive parents and to all agencies involved, the South 
Carolina Court concluded that “there were some efforts to conceal [the birth 
father’s] Indian status.”37  Specifically, the birth mother “initially .  .  . did 
not wish to identify the father, said she wanted to keep things [as] low-key 
as possible for the [adoptive parents], because he’s registered in the 
Cherokee tribe.  It was determined that naming him would be detrimental to 
the adoption.”38  In addition, the lawyer who was hired by the adoptive 
parents to represent the birth mother misspelled the birth father’s name and 
misrepresented his birth date in the letter to the Cherokee Nation.  The 
Cherokee Nation, faced with inaccurate information, therefore responded 
that they could not confirm that the child was an Indian child.39  Finally, the 
birth mother, when it came time to deliver the baby, requested that the 
hospital put her on “no report” status, meaning that if anyone inquired about 
her, the hospital should list her as not admitted.  After delivery, the birth 
mother listed the baby’s status as Hispanic only (and not Native American 
or Cherokee) on the form necessary under Oklahoma law to approve the 
baby’s transfer from the state.40  Baby Veronica was therefore delivered 
shortly after her birth into the arms of the adoptive parents and taken to 
their home in South Carolina without the additional procedures, including 
notification to the Tribe and likely refusal to transfer from Oklahoma, 
which the ICWA would have required.41 
For his part, the birth father, after failing to convince the birth mother 
to move up their wedding, told the birth mother that he would relinquish his 
parental rights rather than pay child support.  He testified, however, that he 
thought that the birth mother would keep the child, and that if he gave her 
some time and space, the couple would reconcile and raise the baby 
 
36  See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2558. 
37  Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 398 S.C. 625 (2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 
38  See Adoptive Couple, 398 S.C. at 632. 
39  See id. 
40  Id. at 633. 
41  See id. at 633-34. 
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together.42 While the birth father acknowledged that some of his 
interactions with the birth mother were not models of exemplary parenting, 
“Mother never informed Father that she intended to place the baby up for 
adoption.  Father insists that, had he known this, he would have never 
considered relinquishing his rights.”43 
The adoptive parents filed for adoption in South Carolina when Baby 
Veronica was nine days old.  The birth father was not served with notice of 
the adoption until four months later, on the eve of his deployment to Iraq 
for military service.  Initially, when the process server pressed the papers on 
him, the birth father signed away his right to object to the adoption.  As 
soon as he realized that it was an outside adoption rather than 
relinquishment to the birth mother, he tried to get the papers back: “I then 
tried to grab the paper up.  [The process server] told me that I could not 
grab that [sic] because .  .  . I would be going to jail if I was to do any harm 
to the paper.”44  The birth father immediately consulted with his family, 
contacted a lawyer, and the next day filed for a stay of the adoption 
proceedings.45 
Like most family law stories that make their way to popular 
consciousness, by the time Baby Veronica’s case reached the U.S.  
Supreme Court there would be no universal happy ending.  The rest of the 
case and its history are recounted in the Supreme Court opinion: the South 
Carolina family court awarded custody to the birth father in 2011 and Baby 
Veronica was transferred to her father’s custody.  The adoptive parents 
appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, which affirmed the lower 
court’s decision under the ICWA.46  The adoptive parents then petitioned 
for certiorari to the Supreme Court, where they won and, at the age of four, 
Baby Veronica was ordered to be returned to their custody.47 
Had a few things gone differently, Baby Veronica would in all 
likelihood never have been placed with the adoptive family in the first 
place.  If the birth mother had clarified that she intended to give the child up 
for adoption; if the birth mother’s lawyer had spelled the father’s name 
correctly and/or referenced his actual birth date; if the birth mother had not 
omitted Baby Veronica’s Cherokee heritage from the form required by 
Oklahoma to allow her transfer out of state; if any one or all of these had 
occurred, Baby Veronica would have been placed with her biological father 
 
42 See id. at 631. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 634. 
45 See id. 
46 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2556-57 (2013). 
47 See id. at 2559, 2565; see also Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 404 S.C. 483 (2013) (directing 
entry of order finalizing adoption after remand from U.S. Supreme Court). 
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from the outset.  While that outcome may not be the preferred result of 
those who think that birth mothers should have a greater say than birth 
fathers about the placement of their biological children, it would 
(presumably) not strike the same nerve as the specter of removing a child 
who was two years old from, as Justice Alito wrote “the only parents she 
had ever known.”48  In other words, the attempt to avoid the ICWA’s 
application in the first place created the sympathetic factual scenario that 
became its own logic for interpreting the ICWA narrowly in order to place 
Baby Veronica with the adoptive parents. 
Justice Alito’s several references to the (apparently) troublingly slim 
connection that Baby Veronica had to her Cherokee heritage must be 
examined in this light.  It is correct that but for this heritage, Baby 
Veronica’s adoption would have proceeded quite differently.  It is also the 
case, however, that but for the attempt to avoid the ICWA’s application to 
Baby Veronica, she would have had a stable placement with her father or 
his relatives from the outset of her life.  Furthermore, as Justice Sotomayor 
emphasized in her dissent, several states recognize similarly strong rights 
by birth fathers in the adoption context, including Arizona, Washington and 
Nevada.49  In other words, it is not just membership in an Indian tribe that 
can result in distinctive treatment in the adoption context.  If the adoption 
had taken place in Washington, it also would have required additional 
procedural and substantive protections for the father.50  Flukes of birth, 
geographical and otherwise, lead to different legal regimes.  What troubled 
Justice Alito was that this fluke sounded in ancestry rather than geography.  
And yet, Baby Veronica’s lineal descent from a member of the Cherokee 
Nation’s historic rolls is what constituted her eligibility for tribal 
membership.  When the Justice wrote, disparagingly, that Baby Veronica 
was “classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256) Cherokee,”51 he 
could have written that she was “classified as an Indian because she was 
eligible for membership in a federally recognized Indian tribe.” All Justice 
Alito was doing, in essence, was repeating that Baby Veronica met the 
tribe’s political membership requirements. 
Justice Alito’s apparent discomfort with Baby Veronica’s “1.2%” 
status begs the question of whether it would have been any less troubling if 
the Cherokee Nation had a different set of membership requirements, 
perhaps with a higher degree of “Cherokee blood.”  If Baby Veronica had 
been “more Indian by blood,” would it have struck the Justices as less 
unfair that a white family could not adopt her?  Justice Alito’s repeated (and 
 
48  Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2556. 
49  See id. at 2581-82 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
50  See id. 
51  Id. at 2552, 2556 (emphasis added). 
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unnecessary) references to Baby Veronica’s percentage of Cherokee 
heritage resonate in unfortunate ways with the eliminationist agenda behind 
the racialization of American Indians during some of our most shameful 
historical periods.52  The eliminationist logic that Justice Alito (no doubt 
unknowingly) echoed was that Indian tribes must eventually disappear, and 
that one pathway for making them do so was to shrink the number of people 
eligible to be tribal members.53 
B.  Morton v. Mancari and the Political-not-Racial Distinction 
Had the Court gone any further than merely mentioning its concern 
about the constitutionality of the ICWA’s application to Baby Veronica, it 
would have run into its own wall of precedent.  In Morton v. Mancari, the 
Supreme Court upheld a Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) employment 
preference against a challenge brought by non-Indian plaintiffs.54  The 
Court held that federal classifications that benefit American Indians should 
be upheld so long as they can be tied to “Congress’ unique obligations 
toward the Indians.”55  To put this in the context of equal protection 
doctrine generally, the Supreme Court has settled on a three-tier system for 
the judicial review of equal protection challenges to federal or state actions 
that burden or benefit particular groups.56  First, the Court subjects most 
classifications to rational basis review, meaning that if the legal distinction 
is based on any facially plausible rationale, the Court will not second-guess 
the legislative decision.57  Second, a middle-tier of review (known as 
“intermediate scrutiny”), applied most commonly to classifications based 
on sex, asks whether the distinction is reasonably related to an important 
governmental objective.58  And third, classifications based on race or 
 
52 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1065-70; see also Bethany Berger, Red: Racism and 
the American Indian, 56 UCLA L. REV. 591 (2009) 
53 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1070. 
54 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
55 Id. at 555. 
56 Equal protection challenges to federal action are brought under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment rather than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies 
only to states, but the “Court repeatedly has held that the Fifth Amendment imposes on the Federal 
Government the same standard required of state legislation by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”  Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221, 226 n.6 (1981) (citing Weinberger v.  
Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 768-70 (1975)); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971). 
57 See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (upholding state law requiring police 
officers to retire at age fifty); San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (upholding school 
funding system that discriminated against poor districts); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLE AND POLICIES 669-74 (3d ed. 2006) (summarizing tiers of judicial 
review).  But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (applying strengthened version of rational basis 
review to equal protection challenge involving distinctions based on sexual orientation). 
58 For the latest articulation of the gender standard of intermediate scrutiny, see United States v. 
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996).  On very rare occasions, the Supreme Court has applied heightened 
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ethnicity are subject to the Court’s most exacting review (“strict scrutiny”), 
which asks whether there is a compelling state interest that supports the 
classification and whether the government’s means of achieving that 
interest are narrowly tailored to the government’s objective.59  Overtly 
discriminatory classifications—those that deprive racial or ethnic groups of 
access to programs or benefits because of their racial or ethnic status—
nearly automatically fail strict scrutiny.60  The harder cases involve either 
actions that do not overtly sort people based on race or ethnicity, but that 
nonetheless result in disparate effects on minority racial or ethnic groups, or 
actions that sort people by race or ethnicity with the benign purpose of 
either remedying past discrimination or promoting diversity.61  Challenges 
to affirmative action programs in education and employment fall into the 
latter category.62 
In Mancari, the Court adopted a form of the first type of review—
rational basis review—for federal classifications singling out members of 
American Indian tribes for distinctive treatment.  According to Mancari, if 
the classification is based on tribal members’ political affiliation with a 
recognized American Indian tribe63 and furthers Congress’s “unique 
obligation” to American Indians, then the Court will not subject it to a 
heightened form of judicial review.64  Applied straight up, the ICWA 
should pass this test easily, even on the facts of the Baby Veronica case.  
Veronica was eligible for membership in her tribe based on the Cherokee 
 
review based on an ad-hoc mix of factors.  See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (factors 
warranting heightened scrutiny included childhood, education, and minority status). 
59 See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005) (strict scrutiny must be used in evaluating 
the routine racial segregation of new intake prisoners); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995) (federal affirmative action programs must meet strict scrutiny); Wygant v.  Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267 (1986) (striking down school board’s policy of extending preferential protection against 
layoffs to some employees because of their race); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 694-95. 
60 See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984) (state court acted unconstitutionally by taking into 
account a stepfather’s race in child custody case); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (finding state 
miscegenation statute unconstitutional); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down statute 
requiring the race of candidates for office to be listed on ballots); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 57, at 671 
(“Strict scrutiny is virtually always fatal to the challenged law.”). 
61 See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); 
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469 (1989); 
McKlesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (proof of racially disproportionate impact in administration of 
death penalty did not constitute equal protection violation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) 
(upholding police departments use of a test that disproportionately disadvantaged African-American 
applicants). 
62 See Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Gratz, 539 U.S. 244; Adarand, 515 U.S. 200; Croson, 488 U.S. 
469. 
63 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974) (“The preference is not directed towards a 
‘racial’ group consisting of ‘Indians’; instead, it applies only to members of ‘federally recognized’ 
tribes.”). 
64 Id. at 555. 
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Nations’ rules, and the ICWA furthers Congress’s obligation to ensure the 
survival of tribes by eliminating rampant and biased activities that 
dismantled tribal families. 
For a host of practical and legal reasons, the Mancari rule makes 
sense.  As the Mancari Court noted, the Federal Government has been 
treating American Indian tribes and their members distinctively since the 
country’s founding.65  License for distinctive treatment exists in the 
Constitution,66 in the history of federal-tribal legal relations,67 and in 
international law norms that formed the basis for domestic federal Indian 
law.68  Further, if the Court had held otherwise, federal courts could be 
subjecting scores of treaties, statutes, and policies to heightened judicial 
scrutiny.69  Perhaps this unmanageability has kept courts in check on these 
issues.  If they peek behind the curtain of tribal political classifications, they 
will have to assume the wizard’s role, deciding one case at a time whether a 
distinction that affects tribes or tribal members withstands strict scrutiny.70  
Doing so would take courts well beyond their traditional competencies, and 
intrude into centuries of agreements and relations with hundreds of tribes. 
C.  Nipping at Mancari 
Whether due to the strength of Mancari’s underlying rationale or to the 
Supreme Court’s concerns about its institutional competence (or both), to 
date Mancari has survived intact.  Adoptive Couple did not come out of 
nowhere, however.  For years, various parties, including some ideologically 
and politically motivated interest groups, have mounted challenges to 
classifications that benefit tribes and tribal members in an effort to have the 
Court overturn or modify Mancari.71  Mancari’s opponents have relied on 
language in two post-Mancari Supreme Court cases to support their 
arguments. 
First, in Adarand Constructors, Inc., the Supreme Court considered a 
 
65 See id. at 551-53. 
66 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[Congress has the power to . . .] regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes . . . .”). 
67 See William W. Quinn, Federal Acknowledgment of American Indian Tribes: The Historical 
Development of a Legal Concept, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 331, 338-47 (1990). 
68 See ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 218 (1990); Philip P. Frickey, Domesticating Federal Indian Law, 81 MINN. 
L. REV. 31 (1996); see also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 
U.S. 1 (1831); Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823) (relying on the discovery doctrine, including its 
origins in international law, as basis for U.S. relations with tribes). 
69 See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. 
70 See Carole Goldberg, American Indians and “Preferential” Treatment, 49 UCLA L. REV. 943, 
955-57 (2002). 
71 See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 25 (describing efforts of Mountain States Legal Foundation 
and Paul Clement to overturn or narrow Mancari). 
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challenge to a federal program offering financial incentives to contractors 
who hired subcontractors controlled by economically and socially 
disadvantaged groups.72  The federal program listed certain races and 
ethnicities as having presumptive status as socially disadvantaged, 
including African American, Hispanic, Asian Pacific, Subcontinent Asian, 
and Native American.73  The issue before the Court was whether the 
program should be reviewed under the intermediate standard of scrutiny, 
announced in Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC,74 or strict scrutiny, which 
would require the Federal Government to show that its interest in the 
preference was compelling, and that it had employed the least restrictive 
means of meeting that interest.75 
Adarand was an important case for opponents of affirmative action 
programs, who had already succeeded in subjecting state-based versions to 
the highest level of scrutiny.76  If federal preferences could be treated 
similarly, then the era of benign governmental uses of race and ethnicity to 
level the social and economic playing field would be all but over.  In 
Adarand, that goal was achieved.  The Court concluded that Metro 
Broadcasting, its precedent of just five years earlier, should be overturned.77  
Justice O’Connor disparaged Metro Broadcasting for its conclusion that 
race could be presumed to be a benign category, even if its purpose was to 
allow participation by historically disadvantaged groups.78  Adhering to the 
view that the Constitution protects individuals, not groups, Justice 
O’Connor concluded that any use of race was presumptively suspicious 
because its effect was to burden individuals with the government’s effort to 
create greater economic opportunity for disadvantaged groups.79 
Adarand did not address legislation or classifications passed in 
furtherance of Congress’ unique obligation to American Indian tribes.  Yet 
because Adarand applied the Court’s highest scrutiny to actions by 
Congress, it has been looked upon as a first step toward questioning 
Mancari.80  Advocates and some courts have seized on language in Justice 
Stevens’ Adarand dissent, which cautioned that the Court’s reasoning could 
lead toward the conclusion that the federal relationship with tribes should 
 
72  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204 (1995). 
73  See id. at 207. 
74  497 U.S. 547 (1990). 
75  See id. 
76  See Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
77  See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
78  See id. at 226. 
79  Id. at 226-27. 
80  See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 25, at 51-53 (discussing cases and briefs arguing that 
Adarand undermines Mancari). 
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be seen in the same light as invidious racial classifications.81  Justice 
Stevens was warning about this interpretation; not embracing it nor stating 
it was inevitable.82  Nonetheless, in Williams v. Babbitt, the Ninth Circuit 
refused to read a Native American preference into the Reindeer Act of 
1937, concluding that to do so would raise “grave” constitutional 
questions.83  The Babbitt court relied on what it claimed to be Justice 
Stevens’ assessment of the “logical implications” of Adarand, and then 
went so far as to predict that Mancari’s “days are numbered.”84  To date, 
that prediction has not held.  Eighteen years after Adarand, the Supreme 
Court has yet to question Mancari directly. 
Nonetheless, a second Supreme Court case, Rice v. Cayetano,85 
provides succor to Mancari’s detractors on different grounds.  In Rice, a 
non-Native Hawaiian challenged voting restrictions for the Office of 
Hawaiian Affairs (OHA).  The OHA was created by Hawaii to administer 
programs for Native Hawaiians consistent with the State’s historic and legal 
obligations to its indigenous population.  Hawaii restricted voting for the 
OHA Board of Trustees to Native Hawaiians, defined according to when 
their ancestors arrived in Hawaii.  The State argued that the classification 
was based on lineal descent from indigenous peoples, and not on race or 
ethnicity, but the Court found that the ancestry component of the 
requirement was merely a “proxy” for race.86  On one hand, Rice did not 
question Mancari itself.87  Rather, Rice held that Mancari did not apply to 
the Hawaii voting law for two reasons.  First, the state, and not the Federal 
Government, had imposed the restriction.  Second, Native Hawaiians are 
not a federally recognized tribe.88  The Court therefore struck down the 
State’s voting restriction on Fifteenth Amendment grounds.89  Yet Rice’s 
language about the equivalence between ancestry and “race” opens the door 
to reasoning that questions tribal membership rules and leaves them 
vulnerable to being seen as invidious racial classifications.  Justice Alito’s 
repeated references to Baby Veronica’s percentage of Cherokee blood echo 
this conflation of lineal descent and race.90  Thus, while Rice is even less 
directly challenging to Mancari than Adarand, together the cases provide 
distinct building blocks for those pursuing an anti-tribal agenda.  They urge 
 
81 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 244 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
82 See id. 
83 Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 666 (9th Cir. 1997). 
84 Id. at 665. 
85 528 U.S. 495 (2000). 
86 Id. at 514. 
87 See id. at 519. 
88 See id. at 520. 
89 See id. at 517. 
90 See generally supra notes 49-53, and accompanying text. 
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that the Federal Government should treat all distinct groups equally, 
irrespective of history, context, and purpose.  Unique legal obligations and 
political relationships, some of which inevitably are rooted in ancestry, are 
seen as no worthier of deferential treatment by the courts than overtly 
discriminatory and exclusionary laws.91 
II.  FEDERAL RECOGNITION IS POLITICAL: A TRIP TO FLORIDA 
Mancari made the distinction between classifications that address 
members of federally recognized tribes, and those that distinguish only 
based on race or ethnicity.92  As discussed above, one approach to eroding 
Mancari is to question whether the political status (and membership rules) 
of tribes are just a “proxy for race.” Tribes are composed of members who 
share ancestry.  This seems to cut against liberal consent-based norms for 
democratic governance, lending credence to the notion that lineage and race 
are indistinguishable constructs.93  To question the political status of tribes, 
however, is to delve into the history of federal recognition itself, including 
the process by which indigenous peoples traveled from free and 
independent polities to the legal category of “federally recognized tribe” 
that they occupy today.94  That history reveals that federally recognized 
tribal status is indeed political, in nearly every sense of the word.  Power, 
violence, and resistance characterized the process, and inevitably racial 
formation played, and continues to play, a role.95  Tribes, in other words, 
are political even while they reflect the unique ways in which American 
Indians were racialized by the American version of settler-colonialism.96  In 
other articles, I have explored how these processes played out for the 
Colorado River Indian Tribes and the several federally recognized tribes in 
the Dakotas that were carved out of the Great Sioux Nation.97  Here, I apply 
a similar analysis to the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the Miccosukee 
Tribe of Florida. 
A.  Seminole and Miccosukee: Separate Tribes, Shared Roots 
Today, the indigenous people known as Seminole are divided into 
three federally recognized tribes and one non-recognized group.  Two of the 
 
91 See Smith & Mayhew, supra note 25. 
92 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 553 n.24 (1974). 
93 See Gover, supra note 7, at 250.  To be clear, however, all members of tribes must also consent 
to their enrollment.  Consent is therefore necessary but not sufficient for membership in an American 
Indian tribe. 
94 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1061-83. 
95 See id. 
96 See id. at 1118-22. 
97 See id.; see also Krakoff, Settler Colonialism and Reclamation, supra note 2. 
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three federally recognized tribes are in Florida—the Seminole Tribe of 
Florida, and the Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida—the third is the 
Seminole Nation of Oklahoma.  The non-recognized group is the 
Traditional (or Independent) Seminole Nation.98  The Seminole Tribe of 
Florida’s land base includes the Big Cypress Reservation, Brighton 
Reservation, Hollywood Reservation, Immokalee Reservation, Tampa 
Reservation, and Fort Pierce Reservation.  The Miccosukee Tribe’s lands 
consist of four reservations, the Tamiami Trail Reservation, Alligator Alley 
Reservation (the largest, at a size of nearly 75,000 acres), and two smaller 
reservations at the intersection of Krome Avenue and the Tamiami Trail in 
Miami.  The Seminole people (the term “Seminole” will be used to refer to 
all people of Seminole origin, regardless of current political affiliation in 
the Seminole or Miccosukee Tribes) speak two languages with common 
linguistic roots—Muskogee and Mikasuki.99  The Miccosukee and most 
Seminole Tribe members speak Mikasuki, while Seminole Tribe members 
at the Brighton Reservation speak Muskogee.100 
As historian Brent Weisman has observed, “[t]he division between the 
Seminole and Miccosukee tribes reflects differing responses by groups of 
related people to the federal tribal recognition process rather than deep-
seated differences in cultural or historical origins.”101  The story of how 
Florida’s indigenous people of shared origins became differentiated into 
several political entities, each also with a distinct cultural identity, reflects 
the processes of settler occupation of North America, fluctuating U.S.  
policies toward tribes, and indigenous responses of survival and adaptation. 
1.  From “Creek” to “Seminole” 
As with all histories of indigenous peoples in the pre-contact period, 
much of what we know about Florida and the Southeast has been 
reconstructed from archeological sources.  According to these, when 
Spanish explorers first arrived in Florida in the early 1500s, the indigenous 
population was roughly 350,000.102  Diseases brought by Europeans 
coupled with deliberate efforts to exterminate the indigenous population, 
resulting in devastating population losses.  By the 1700s, the Southeast 
 
98 See Kirsten Matoy Carlson & Robert T. Coulter, Natural Allies: Conservationists, Indian 
Tribes, and Protecting Native North America, in TRIBES, LAND AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Ezra Rosser & 
Sarah Krakoff, eds., 2012). 
99 Brent R. Weisman, Nativism, Resistance, and Ethnogenesis of the Florida Seminole Indian 
Identity, in 41:4 HIST. ARCHAEOLOGY 198, 199 (2007). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 See JERALD T. MILANICH, FLORIDA’S INDIANS: FROM ANCIENT TIMES TO THE PRESENT at viii 
(1998). 
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indigenous population was already transformed significantly by Spanish, 
British, and French settlement.103  Almost all of the pre-contact indigenous 
peoples in Florida were gone, either because they did not survive the 
European invasion or had been forced to leave the area.104  As a result, the 
indigenous population of Florida in the 1700s was composed predominately 
of Creek Indians who migrated from elsewhere in the Southeast, as well as 
small populations of Florida’s indigenous peoples who managed to survive 
from pre-contact times. 
The Creeks who migrated into Florida became known as Lower 
Creeks, and those who ended up in Alabama, as Upper Creeks.  These 
Creek migrations were a response to British expansion throughout 
Georgia.105  The division into Lower and Upper Creeks was the first 
European-provoked step toward the eventual split into Seminole and Creek 
peoples.  According to Weisman, “[i]t was from the Lower Creeks that the 
founding populations of Seminole were to come.”106 
Seminole political and cultural identity was forged during the 
eighteenth century, when the Spanish attempted repeatedly to confine the 
Lower Creeks in Florida to missions or communities near trading posts.  
The Lower Creeks who refused to comply moved further into central 
Florida and occupied land that had been largely (though not entirely) 
abandoned by the Apalachee and other indigenous peoples who predated 
the Spanish.107  During this period, the Spanish began to refer to the Lower 
Creeks and other indigenous peoples uniformly as “cimmarones,” which 
became Seminole in Creek pronunciation, meaning people who would not 
be subdued.108  The term Seminole thus grew out of a blanket label that 
Europeans applied to people they assumed to be Lower Creek, but that the 
people themselves (of Lower Creek but also more diverse indigenous 
origins) appropriated as a self-defining term of resistance. 
The Seminoles’ resistance to colonial power grew throughout the 
century, and culminated in an event that Weisman pinpoints as the date at 
which Seminole identity truly began: “[i]f the birth of the Seminole can be 
traced to a specific time and place, that date is November 18, 1765, the 
place, Picolata on the banks of St. Johns River west of St. Augustine, 
 
103 See id.; see also Weisman, supra note 99, at 200. 
104 MILANICH, supra note 102, at viii. 
105 BRENT RICHARDS WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE: FLORIDA’S SEMINOLE AND 
MICCOSUKEE INDIANS 12 (1999). 
106 Id. at 12. 
107 Id. at 13-14.  Not all of Florida’s pre-contact indigenous inhabitants were gone, and the 
Seminole today also reflect the integration of Lower Creek with these peoples.  See generally Frequently 
Asked Questions, SEMINOLE TRIBE OF FLORIDA, http://www.semtribe.com/FAQ/ (last visited Mar. 31, 
2014). 
108 WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 14; Weisman, supra note 99, at 200. 
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Florida.”109  At that point, the British controlled Florida.  The British 
Governor had invited the Lower Creeks to a gathering at which he planned 
to explain that the entire peninsula was under British rule.  The Governor 
requested land cessions from the Lower Creek chiefs for all claims east of 
the St. Johns.  A ceremony was conducted, and the Lower Creeks and the 
British appeared to have reached an agreement.  According to Weisman, 
what the Governor “did not understand was that Cowkeeper of the Alachua 
band held himself apart from this conference, and in so doing made it clear 
that the Lower Creeks did not speak for his interest.”110  Cowkeeper, a 
formidable Seminole leader, forged his tribe’s identity by refusing to 
participate in the land cessions, and instead arranging a meeting of his own 
in December to negotiate with the British on his own terms.111  The results 
included that a vast swathe of central Florida, today south of Gainesville, 
would “become a heartland of the Seminole nation . . . .”112 
2.  Seminole Identity Formation: The First, Second, and Third 
Seminole Wars 
Cowkeeper’s strategic separation from the Creeks marked the 
beginning of a distinct Seminole identity, and the ensuing decades further 
defined the Seminole through acts of resistance.  After the American 
Revolution, the Spanish regained Florida from the British, but this was to 
be a short-lived acquisition.  The American ideology of Manifest Destiny 
pushed American expansion south as well as west, and conflicts over 
slavery heightened ambitions to eliminate an international border between 
slave states and what they perceived as ungovernable terrain to which their 
“property” could flee.113  Acquiring Florida and removing the Seminole 
would therefore accomplish two racialized goals at once for the young 
United States: property (in the form of land) would be acquired for non-
Indian settlement, (necessitating the disappearance of the Indians 
themselves); and the slave states could reassert their primacy over their 
human property (Black slaves), by the same strategy of eliminating the 
Indians.114  Weisman succinctly describes the zeitgeist of the times, “[i]f 
destiny guided human affairs, and it most surely did, then this much was 
certain: the Seminoles had to go.”115 
 
109 WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 14. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 15. 
113 See id. at 43-44. 
114 See id.; see also WOLFE, supra note 1, at 1-2 (explaining distinct logics of racial construction 
of indigenous peoples versus African Americans in settler-colonial societies). 
115 WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 43. 
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Efforts to eradicate the Seminole from Florida were carried out over 
the course of several decades.  In 1818, General Andrew Jackson, with a 
force that included 1,500 Creek Indians, “swept into Spanish Florida on a 
scorched earth offensive against the Florida Seminoles.”116  This offensive, 
which has become known as the First Seminole War, eliminated several 
Seminole villages and, more importantly for Jackson’s larger strategic 
goals, paved the way for acquiring Florida from Spain.  Having put up very 
little defense to Jackson’s invasion, Spain ceded Florida to the United 
States in 1821. 
Andrew Jackson’s work with respect to eliminating the Seminole was 
not yet complete, however.  Many Seminole had evaded death or capture 
during the First Seminole War, and once Florida formally joined the slave-
holding south, pressure increased to free the territory for white settlement.  
The slave states had particular concerns about the presence of Black 
Seminole (former slaves who escaped to Florida and joined the Seminole, 
many as free men), and in particular the specter of free Blacks living 
alongside slaves.117  During this period, United States Indian Policy in 
general was moving toward strategies of removal and containment, and 
both of these methods were employed to wrest Florida from Seminole 
control.118  To contain the Florida Indians, the government set about 
counting the number of Seminoles and Black Seminoles, and obtaining 
information about who was recognized as a Seminole leader or headman.  
The headmen were then invited to a meeting at Moultrie Creek on the St. 
Johns River, the purpose of which was to dictate the terms of a non-
negotiated treaty.  The Treaty of Moultrie Creek, as it became known, 
confined all Florida Seminoles to designated reservation lands, and 
provided them with annuities and tools for twenty-five years, a school, an 
Indian agent, and other minimal offerings.119  The Treaty also required the 
Seminole to assist in the capture and return of any fugitive slaves.120 
The Treaty of Moultrie Creek and its policy of containment failed 
miserably.  Having never agreed to be confined to the low-quality lands that 
the government designated, a majority of the Seminole refused to move.  
One Seminole leader, Neamathla, negotiated for lands near Apalachicola, 
but otherwise the people had had no say and did not feel bound by the 
 
116 Id. at 45. 
117 See WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 45. 
118 For more on the removal policies generally, see ROBERT ANDERSON, ET AL., AMERICAN 
INDIAN LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARY 50-77 (2nd ed., 2010). 
119 See WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 45-46; see generally Treaty with 
the Florida Tribes of Indians, Sept. 18, 1823, 7 Stat. 224, available at 
http://digital.library.okstate.edu/kappler/vol2/treaties/sem0203.htm. 
120 See Treaty with the Florida Tribes of Indians, art. 7, Sept. 18, 1823, 7 Stat. 224. 
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arbitrary lines drawn by government agents.121  Many Seminole also balked 
at the requirement to return fugitive slaves.  “Black Seminoles had become 
important to the Indians, as partners, as subordinates, as allies.  Who was to 
say which of them was to go back?”122  The attempt to confine the Seminole 
to reservations and cleave the Black Seminoles from among them backfired.  
The Seminoles’ emerging identity as people known for their resistance had 
further solidified through their refusal to be contained.123 
By the 1830s, U.S. policies of Indian removal were in high gear.124  
Government pressure on the Seminole to leave Florida for the proposed 
Indian Territory (today’s Oklahoma) was intense, and some Seminole 
complied.  The ones who refused sharpened their identity through their 
defiance of federal pressure and acts of resistance.  The events that sparked 
the Second Seminole War, which lasted from 1835-42, grew out of this 
context.125  Seminole leaders, including Osceola, who came of age during 
the Seminole resistance to Andrew Jackson’s forces during the Creek War, 
staged an attack on U.S. troops in and around Fort King.  A group of Black 
Seminole, led by Abraham, joined in the resistance as well.126  What 
followed was a seven-year war that drew in every regiment of the U.S. 
Army.  More than 1,500 U.S. troops and hundreds of Seminole were killed, 
and another 4,420 Seminole were removed by force to the Indian 
Territory.127  When the war ended without a treaty in 1842, only 300 
Seminoles were left in Florida.128  One final burst of resistance, known as 
the Third Seminole War (1855-58), resulted in the deportation of another 
168 Seminole from Florida to Oklahoma.129  At the end of this period, only 
200 or so Seminole remained in the state. 
The federally recognized Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes of Florida 
 
121 See WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 46. 
122 Id. at 47. 
123 See id. at 45-49.  Weisman also discusses the influence of the Creek War of 1814 on the 
emerging Seminole identity.  The conflict, which started as a battle among Creek factions concerning 
pressures to capitulate to American settlement, ended with Andrew Jackson leading U.S. troops against 
the anti-assimilationist Creeks.  See id. at 48.  Many Creeks were killed, but some fled into Florida, 
spurring Jackson to pursue them in what became the First Seminole War, discussed above.  Jackson’s 
failure to capture the fleeing Creeks, who then remained in Florida and became Seminole, contributed to 
the emerging Seminole identity as people who would not be subdued.  As Weisman notes, among the 
Indians that evaded capture was a “boy in his early teen years . . . who was to be known in manhood as 
Osceola . . . .” Id. at 48. 
124 See ANDERSON, supra note 118, at 52-53. 
125 See WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 49. 
126 See id. at 50-51. 
127 See id. at 57-58.  But see James W.  Covington, Trail Indians of Florida, in 58:1 FLA. HIST. 
Q. 37, 38 (July 1979) (providing figure of 3,000 Seminoles who had been captured or surrendered 
during Second and Third Seminole Wars). 
128 WEISMAN, UNCONQUERED PEOPLE, supra note 105, at 57. 
129 See id. at 59. 
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and the non-recognized Independent Seminoles, who today have a 
combined population of nearly 3,000, descend from this group of 200 who 
resisted the U.S. military’s repeated efforts to remove them from Florida.  
Brent Weisman has theorized that the Seminole response to Removal 
during the Second Seminole War in particular solidified their identity as a 
distinct people: 
Like other native peoples in postcontact North America whose 
political and ethnic identities reflect contact with an intrusive society, 
the Seminoles had pluralistic cultural and biological origins and were 
composed of groups speaking different languages with distinct 
histories . . . .  In the organized resistance to the removal effort [during 
the period of the Second Seminole War], the Seminole identity was 
given birth as a ‘creative adaptation’ to violent change.130 
To summarize, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the process of 
“creative adaptation” had crystallized into a clear Seminole identity.  That 
identity was forged during several periods of American policies toward 
Native people that dislocated them from their pre-contact lands through 
invasion, disease, war, and forced removal.  Larger economic and social 
forces, including the battle over slavery and its extension into the territories, 
also contributed to the unique ethnic and cultural composition of the people 
who became Seminole.  The combined efforts to eliminate indigenous 
peoples and secure the South for a plantation economy resulted in a 
vigorously independent group, descended largely from the Lower Creeks 
but also including other indigenous and African-American people, who 
became the Seminole Indians of Florida. 
3.  From Seminole to the Federally Recognized Seminole and 
Miccosukee Tribes of Florida 
The roughly 200 Seminole who remained in Florida after the Third 
Seminole War lived in village and clan-based communities throughout 
southern Florida.131  Non-Indian settlement continued to put pressure on 
these communities, however, and despite Seminole resistance to being 
confined to specific reservations, the need to secure at least some lands 
from drainage and incursion became increasingly necessary for survival.  
The Seminole reestablished limited relations with the state and federal 
governments toward the end of the nineteenth century, and secured state 
and federal reservation lands during the period between 1911 and 1935.132 
 
130 Weisman, supra note 99, at 198-99. 
131 See Covington, supra note 127, at 38. 
132 See generally 4 NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LEGACY OF HARRY S.  TRUMAN, THE TRUMAN 
LEGACY SERIES (Brian Hosmer ed., 2006); see also Jessica R.  Cattelino, Termination Redux? Seminole 
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During these years, the next shift in Seminole political and cultural 
identity occurred.  The Big Cypress Reservation was established in 1937, 
and the government appointed a white man who spoke Mikasuki to be the 
agent there.133  The agent was able to recruit several of the families living 
nearby to move to the reservation.  According to historian James W.  
Covington, “Those . . . who left their villages to live on the Big Cypress 
Reservation represented an element of the Indian population undergoing 
rapid change.”134  One aspect of this was that some Seminoles were 
converting to Christianity, and in particular becoming members of the 
Baptist faith.  The Big Cypress Reservation was a place where “a center for 
the Christians could be maintained.”135 
Other Seminoles remained in villages in and near the Everglades.  
They maintained a land-based economy and culture, supporting themselves 
by hunting, fishing, small-scale agriculture, and gathering wild plants.136  
When the Tamiami Trail (U.S. Highway 41) was constructed to cut through 
the Everglades, some of these Seminole moved to scattered communities 
along the Highway, and became known as the “Trail Indians.”137  The 
Seminole from these communities who refused to move to the Big Cypress 
or other reservations created an identity distinct from the Seminoles who 
had relocated, and eventually the two groups formed the basis for what 
would become two distinct federally recognized tribes.  To some extent, the 
divide was cultural.  The Trail Indians identified as hewing more closely to 
indigenous cultural and religious practices than the Seminole who had 
moved onto reservations.138  In addition to refusing to relocate, they took 
pride in their independence from federal assistance and their maintenance of 
traditional ecological knowledge, which they passed on to the younger 
generations.139  Despite these emerging differences in cultural identity, all 
Seminole, whether reservation-based or not, kept their core traditions alive.  
The most significant practice was (and remains) the Green Corn Dance, and 
this “central religious, social, and political focus of tribal life” was 
maintained by all Seminole, whether on-reservation or not.140 
Given all that the Trail group and the reservation Seminoles shared, it 
seems unlikely that the emerging cultural differences would have been 
 
Citizenship and Economy from Truman to Gaming in 4 NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE LEGACY OF 
HARRY S.  TRUMAN, THE TRUMAN LEGACY SERIES 122-35 (Brian Hosmer, ed., 2006). 
133  Covington, supra note 127, at 40. 
134  Id. at 40. 
135  Id. at 40-41. 
136  Id. at 40. 
137  See generally id. 
138  See id. at 42. 
139  See id. at 40, 42. 
140  Id. at 42. 
KRAKOFF_PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2014  1:23 PM 
2014] Constitutional Concern, Membership, & Race 317 
enough on their own to cause the formal split into two tribes.  Instead, the 
catalysts were legal and political.  First, the reservation-based Seminoles 
filed a claim against the United States under the Indian Claims Commission 
Act for taking Seminole land and other violations during the period of the 
Seminole Wars.141  The Seminole who filed the case had hired a law firm to 
represent them, but the bands of people living along the Tamiami Trail or 
otherwise outside of the reservations had not participated in nor authorized 
the representation.142  The Trail Indians, most of whom spoke Mikasuki, 
sought their own legal counsel and began to differentiate themselves from 
the legal and political strategies of the reservation Seminole.143  During this 
process, the Miccosukee emerged as a distinct self-governing political 
entity. 
Second, while the claims case was being pursued, the Federal 
Government embarked on its short-lived and disastrous policy of 
terminating the federal relationship with American Indian tribes.  The 
Termination Era (1947-1961), as it is known, began after World War II 
when various political sentiments converged on the conclusion that the 
“Indian problem” could be solved once and for all by eliminating the 
separate political status of American Indian tribes.144  Federal bureaucrats 
and politicians hatched the idea, and it had a sufficient veneer of equality 
and civil rights to gain momentum.  Senator Arthur V. Watkins, the Chair 
of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs held blatantly prejudiced views 
of American Indians, including that “[t]hey want all the benefits of the 
things we have . . . highways, schools, hospitals, everything that civilization 
furnishes, but they don’t want to help pay their share of it.”145 Yet Watkins 
was also convinced that his effort to impose termination unilaterally on 
Indian people was a benevolent act of emancipation: 
In view of the historic policy of Congress favoring freedom for the 
Indians, we may well expect future Congresses to continue to endorse 
the principle that “as rapidly as possible” we should end the status of 
Indians as wards of the government and grant them all of the rights and 
prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship. 
 With the aim of equality before the law in mind our course should 
rightly be no other . . . .  Following in the footsteps of the 
 
141 See id. at 41. 
142 See id. at 42. 
143 See id. at 42-43; see also Harry A. Kersey, Jr., “Give Us Twenty-Five Years”: Florida 
Seminoles from New Termination to Self-Determination, 1953-1957, in 67:3 FLA. HIST. Q. 290, 298 (Jan.  
1989). 
144 See ANDERSON, supra note 118, at 142-45. 
145 CHARLES WILKINSON, BLOOD STRUGGLE: THE RISE OF MODERN INDIAN NATIONS 68-69 
(2005) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Emancipation Proclamation of ninety-four years ago, I see the 
following words emblazoned in letters of fire above the heads of 
Indians—THESE PEOPLE SHALL BE FREE!146 
For the overwhelming majority of American Indian people, freedom 
meant keeping their lands and maintaining their separate political status, not 
eliminating them.  But neither Watkins nor any other of the architects of 
termination had bothered to ask them.  House Concurrent Resolution 108, 
which outlined the Termination era’s goals, was passed without any 
meaningful consultation with tribes.147  Termination policies included 
subjecting some tribes to state criminal and civil laws, funding urban 
relocation programs to incentivize tribal people to leave their reservations, 
and eliminating the separate political status and trust relationship with 
certain listed tribes.148  For reasons that remain somewhat mysterious, the 
Florida Seminoles were on H.C.R. 108’s list of tribes to be considered for 
termination.149  While tribes were afforded virtually no input concerning 
whether they should be on the list, Congress had to pass a separate 
termination bill for each tribe.  Hearings were conducted on the bills, and 
this was when the Seminole and other tribes had a brief and vital chance to 
make their voices heard. 
The Senate and the House of Representatives introduced companion 
Seminole termination bills in January of 1954.  Senator Watkins presided 
over hearings on the bills before a joint subcommittee in March of the same 
year.  The Seminole bills provided that within three years, the Secretary of 
the Interior would release all tribal lands from protected trust status, transfer 
them to a tribal corporation or its elected trustees, and then open the lands 
for sale.150  Shortly thereafter, the federal trust relationship with the tribe 
would be formally severed.151  Two separate groups of Seminoles, one 
representing the on-reservation and the other the off-reservation, or Trail, 
group, came to Washington to speak against termination.152  A delegation of 
eight people elected by the on-reservation Seminole testified at the hearings 
and entered a prepared statement into the record requesting “that no action 
be taken on the termination of Federal supervision over the property of the 
 
146 ANDERSON, supra note 118, at 143-44 (quoting Arthur V. Watkins, Termination of Federal 
Supervision: The Removal of Restrictions over Indian Property and Person, 311 ANNALS  AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 50, 55 (May, 1957). 
147 See 67 STAT. B132 (Aug. 1, 1953). 
148 See ANDERSON, supra note 118, at 142-51 (summarizing termination era policies). 
149 See Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 292-93 (discussing possible explanations). 
150 Id. at 294-95. 
151 Id. at 295. 
152 See Covington, supra note 127, at 43; Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 295-98. 
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Seminole Indians for a period of 25 years.”153  Their reasons included that 
basic services and infrastructure, including, housing, education, and health 
care, were not yet sufficient to meet the tribe’s needs and allow them to 
manage their own affairs independently.  The inadequate services also 
affected the tribe’s ability to manage its land, and a premature release of 
tribal land from trust status could result in the tribe’s inability to make tax 
payments.154 
The off-reservation Seminole, who increasingly self-identified as 
Miccosukee, also opposed Congress’s actions, but they used different 
rhetoric and tactics.155  George Osceola and Jimmie Billie represented the 
Miccosukee, and instead of testifying before Congress, sought to meet with 
President Eisenhower directly.156  While in Washington, they presented 
their “Buckskin Declaration,” which expressed the Miccosukee intent to 
maintain their separate cultural and political existence as well as their 
land.157  According to historian Harry Kersey, Jr., it was in response to 
President Eisenhower’s sympathetic reply that nonetheless urged the 
Miccosukee to work through existing bureaucratic channels that “the 
Mikasukis [sic] developed a position that they were an independent nation 
with a political existence separate from other Seminoles.”158 
The Seminole and Miccosukee opposition succeeded in staving off the 
termination bills in 1954.159  There was a revival of the idea in 1955, and 
the House Subcommittee on Indian Affairs held hearings in Florida during 
April of that year.  The Seminole and Miccosukee again spoke out against 
termination, and their voices were joined by those of several local officials 
who were concerned about the increased burden on state and local 
services.160  Again, the diverging positions of the Seminole and Miccosukee 
became apparent.  The Miccosukee raised the issue of the Seminole claims 
case during their testimony, with Buffalo Tiger stating “‘We don’t want a 
claim for money’ . . . ‘we want a claim for land.’”161  In the end, no 
Seminole termination legislation was introduced that year or ever after, and 
in retrospect historians have wondered why the Seminole, few in number 
 
153 Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 295 (quoting U.S. Congress, Termination of Federal 
Supervision Over Certain Tribes of Indians, 83d Cong., 2nd sess., on S. 2747 and H.R. 7321, Part 8, 
Seminole Indians, Florida, March 1-2, 1954 (Washington, D.C. 1954)) at 1038. 
154 See Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 295. 
155 See Covington, supra note 127, at 43. 
156 Covington, supra note 127, at 43; Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 299. 
157 Covington, supra note 127, at 43. 
158 Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 299. 
159 Id. at 297-99. 
160 See id. at 300-01. 
161 Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 301 (quoting the hearings before the subcommittee discussed 
supra note 149). 
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and persistently outspoken in their desire to remain independent peoples, 
were on the list at all.162 
The lasting impact for the Seminole and Miccosukee was the 
separation into two federally recognized tribes.  Shortly after the threat of 
termination subsided, the on-reservation Seminoles began to consider 
organizing formally, under the Indian Reorganization Act.  Having barely 
escaped involuntary termination of their separate status, they wanted to 
ensure against any future efforts along those lines.  A group of Seminole 
leaders that included Sam Tommie, Billy Osceoloa, Frank Billie, and Bill 
Osceola led the drive toward IRA organization, and federal officials 
supported them.163  The Miccosukee group refused to join, and the on-
reservation Seminole decided to move forward largely without them.164  In 
1957, an IRA charter was issued to the Seminole Tribe of Florida, and the 
charter was ratified by a majority of voters, who included at least thirty 
percent of those eligible to participate in the election.165  The Tribe then 
adopted its constitution and by-laws, and the Tribal Council became its 
governing body.166  The split between the Seminole Tribe of Florida and the 
Miccosukee was complete. 
The next chapter was for the Miccosukee to obtain separate federally 
recognized status.  They took steps toward formal organization under state 
law during the same period that the Seminoles were working on their IRA 
status.  In 1957, the Everglades Miccosukee General Council adopted a 
constitution that was recognized by the State of Florida.167  Eventually, 
however, the Miccosukee’s efforts to obtain recognition and land from 
Florida ran into opposition.  They began, as the 1960s dawned, to engage in 
pan-Indian organizing and to reach out to international as well as national 
agencies to address their concerns.168  The Miccosukee’s outreach included 
sending a “‘buckskin of recognition’ to Fidel Castro who had just come to 
power in Cuba.”169  The Miccosukee succeeded on several fronts with their 
efforts.  Florida set aside 143,400 acres of the Everglades for their use in 
1959.  Then, with the support of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and no 
opposition from the Seminole Tribe, the Miccosukee adopted a constitution 
and bylaws, and achieved federal recognition in 1962 as the Miccosukee 
 
162 See id. at 303. 
163 Id. at 303-04. 
164 See id. 
165 Id. at 306-07. 
166 Id. 
167 See Covington, supra note 127, at 48-49. 
168 See id. at 52. 
169 Id. at 52. 
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Tribe of Indians of Florida.170 
For both of Florida’s federally recognized tribes, official status has 
brought many benefits.  Federal services, including schools, health care, 
and housing, became available.  Self-determination era policies facilitated 
tribal control over these programs, and also gave the tribes room to build 
their economies while safeguarding their traditions and cultures.171  Their 
separate political status has also furthered the process of divergent identity 
formation for the Seminole and Miccosukee.  Although descending from 
core groups of ancestors, and sharing a history of resisting various efforts to 
eliminate them, their distinct responses to contemporary pressures have 
resulted in two separate political and cultural bodies, albeit with much in 
common.  Within each tribe, the different paths to persisting as Seminole 
are reflected in a modern and evolving polity. 
III.  TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP RULES ARE POLITICAL TOO 
In the decades before their respective federal recognitions in 1957 and 
1962, the Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes shared common ancestry, 
language, and culture, which also inevitably reflected how the Seminole 
people had responded to the processes of settler colonialism.172  Law and 
politics then separated this fairly cohesive (though unquestionably diverse) 
ethnic and cultural group into two distinct federally recognized tribes, each 
of which, to obtain federally recognized status, had to adopt criteria for 
membership going forward.173  Today, both tribes have membership criteria 
that reflect a strong interest in maintaining their distinct identities as 
Seminole and Miccosukee peoples, and in cultivating participation in and 
connection to their cultural and political practices.  Their identities as 
Seminole and Miccosukee also necessarily include the history of 
colonization, attempted elimination, and oppression that they have endured. 
The Seminole Tribe initially adopted membership rules that allowed 
enrollment based on the federal census lists of the Seminole Agency in 
1957.  The following categories of people were eligible for enrollment: (1) 
any person of Seminole Indian blood, regardless of blood quantum, whose 
name appeared on the Census Roll of the Seminole Agency at the time of 
federal recognition; (2) any child of Seminole Indian blood, born to a parent 
 
170 Id. at 53. 
171 See Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 308-09 (describing Miccosukee programs); for a thorough 
overview of tribal programs, see Government, SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., http://www.semtribe.com (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2014); Enterprises SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., http://www.semtribe.com (last visited Mar. 
31, 2014); Services, SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., http://www.semtribe.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2014). 
172 See supra Part II; see also MARK EDWIN MILLER, CLAIMING TRIBAL IDENTITY: THE FIVE 
TRIBES AND THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT 163 (2013). 
173 See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(d). 
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or parents either or both of whose names appeared on the Census Roll, 
regardless of blood quantum or places of residence; (3) any descendant of 
Seminole Indian blood of a person whose name appeared on the Census 
Roll.174  In 1963, the Tribe revised its membership criteria to require one 
quarter or more degree of Seminole Indian blood to be eligible to enroll.175 
Today, to enroll in the Seminole Tribe, three criteria must be met.  First, an 
individual must have “a direct relationship to a Seminole who is listed on 
the 1957 Tribal Roll.”176  Second, the person’s blood quantum must be no 
less than one quarter, “which indicates that she is no more than a single 
generation removed from the cultural heritage.”177  And third, “the applicant 
must be sponsored for membership by a current Tribal member and 
accepted by vote of the Tribal Council.”178 
The Seminole Tribe’s Department of Anthropology & Genealogy 
provides a nuanced explanation for these requirements.  It begins by noting 
that blood quantum itself has “only a limited value . . . .”179  Its purpose is 
not to enforce biological coherence or genealogical purity, but rather to 
track proximity to the tribe’s political formation in 1957 as well as current 
connection to the tribal community.  As the Department states, “[i]n the 
final analysis, [] all of these criteria are dependent upon a single criterion: 
group recognition . . . .  [I]f the group recognizes you as a member, you are 
a member and, if they do not, you are not.”180  In this context, as the Tribe 
makes clear, the blood quantum requirement is not a proxy for race; it is a 
proxy for connection and belonging. 
The Tribe could adopt other criteria that would accomplish the same 
goals, including residence requirements, cultural or linguistic orthodoxy 
requirements, or the “public will of the group.”181  But the blood quantum 
requirement, which essentially requires a familial tie to the previous 
generation of tribal members, maintains the Tribe’s relationship to its 
indigenous heritage, which its people fought for centuries to keep alive.  To 
the Seminole, diluting the one quarter blood quantum requirement would be 
tantamount to conceding their assimilation into non-Indian society just at 
the point when their self-governing powers and separate status are safe from 
attack: “[w]hat all of the wars and treaties and diseases could not 
 
174 CONST. & BYLAWS SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA. of Aug. 21, 1957, available at 
http://Thorpe.ou.edu/IRA/flsemcons.html. 
175 See Kersey, Jr., supra note 143, at 307, citing CONST. AND BYLAWS OF THE SEMINOLE TRIBE 
OF FLA. (as amended), U.S. Dept. of Int., Bureau of Indian Affairs, (D.C., 1967). 
176 See generally SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., supra note 171. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 See id. 
180 Id. 
181 See id. 
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accomplish—the destruction of the Seminoles—would be accomplished 
now, for the sole sake of a misperceived political expediency.”182 
The Seminole Tribe’s explanation also acknowledges the troubled 
history of the Federal Government’s use of blood quantum requirements.  
Tribes themselves had no need for such criteria prior to European contact.  
In pre-contact times, membership was not fixed by colonial processes 
aimed at accounting for and eventually shrinking their populations.183  
Rather, “Indian groups were distinct, and controlled their own memberships 
absolutely, and admitted or rejected whomsoever they pleased.”184  It was 
the United States that first imposed blood quantum requirements on tribes, 
focusing on “this single criterion, and [taking] it out of the context of the 
numerous criteria that the Indians themselves used, and assigned to it an 
unrealistic degree of importance . . . .”185  The Seminole Tribe does not use 
blood quantum in this reductive way, to sort Indians from non-Indians for 
the purpose of federal control.  Rather, the Tribe is clear that it is a tie to the 
Seminole Tribe, its place, and its culture that matters.  A close familial tie is 
one part of that assessment, but not an on/off switch for being considered 
Indian. 
The strong sense that emerges from the Seminole Tribe’s explanation 
of its membership rules is that they aim to ask one core question: are you 
truly a part of our unique Seminole community that has survived despite the 
odds, or would allowing you to join be a small step backward toward the 
abandoned goal of eliminating us?  While the criterion of “blood quantum” 
is part of the equation, it is used to ensure a connection to a political 
community (defined at the moment of legal recognition of the Seminole 
Tribe in 1957) and to perpetuate the cultural norm of group determination 
of membership. 
The Miccosukee Tribe has published less about its membership 
criteria, but the aims appear similar from the face of the Tribe’s rules.  
When the Miccosukee Tribe achieved recognition in 1962, the Constitution 
established membership criteria for the six-month period after ratification 
and approval.  These were: (1) that all adults and children of one-half 
degree or more Miccosukee Indian blood would be eligible for 
membership; (2) that all children of one-half or more Miccosukee Indian 
blood born to members of the Tribe were eligible; and (3) that all adults or 
children of less than one-half degree Miccosukee blood who apply for 
membership and have their applications approved may join the Tribe.186  
 
182 Id. 
183 For more on this process generally, see Inextricably Political, supra note 2. 
184 See SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., supra note 171. 
185 See id. 
186 CONST. MICCOSUKEE TRIBE OF INDIANS FLA., Art. 2, § 1, available at 
KRAKOFF_PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2014  1:23 PM 
324 FIU Law Review [Vol. 9:295 
Today, Miccosukee membership “is open to individuals who have 
Miccosukee mothers and are not enrolled in any other Tribe.”187  The Tribe 
follows its traditional matrilineal system of inheritance and kinship, and 
therefore children are born into their mother’s clan, from which they gain 
status in the Tribe.  The Tribe’s web site also mentions that the 
“Miccosukee Service Area is composed of Tribal members and their 
families, independent Miccosukees, Seminoles and other Indian families 
residing along the Tamiami Trail from Miami to Naples.  The total 
population of the Miccosukee Service [A]rea is about 640.”188  In other 
words, the Miccosukee Tribe serves an indigenous population broader than 
the Tribe’s membership. 
The Seminole and Miccosukee Tribe’s membership criteria reflect the 
road they have traveled to become federally recognized tribes.  The use of 
close ancestry (or “blood quantum”) requirements is an effort to maintain 
their indigenous identities despite the many attempts that have been made to 
eliminate them as separate peoples, which included lumping them with the 
Creeks for the expedience of invading Florida, removing them to the Indian 
territory, and attempting to terminate their political relationship with the 
Federal Government.189  As expressed by the Seminole Tribe, the 
requirement of one degree of removal from a relative who is a tribal 
member reflects a desire to keep an intact community that knows its culture 
and history, and can perpetuate both.190  The Miccosukee Tribe’s 
matrilineal descent requirement reflects the same goals.191 
They may seem anathema to liberal consent-based theories of 
democratic communities, but American Indian tribes’ ancestry requirements 
reflect efforts to reclaim group identities that were assailed until the 
contemporary era.  Until very recently, the overarching logic of U.S. 
policies toward indigenous peoples was to eliminate them.192  Tribes were 
inconvenient barriers to non-Indian settlement and access to natural 
resources.193  Now, federally recognized tribes have some assurance that 
they can continue as separate sovereigns to chart their own economic and 
 
http://www.indigenouspeople.net/micconst.htm (the site labels the Miccosukee Constitution as the 
“Constitution of the Miccosukee Nation,” but the Tribe’s legal name is Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of 
Florida, as evident in the Constitution itself). 
187 Tribal Programs and Business, MICCOSUKEE TRIBE FLA., http://www.miccosukee.com/tribe 
(last visited Mar. 3, 2014). 
188 Id. 
189 See supra Part II. 
190 See SEMINOLE TRIBE FLA., supra note 171. 
191 See MICCOSUKEE TRIBE FLA., Tribal Programs & Business, supra note 187. 
192 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2; Wolfe, supra note 1. 
193 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2; see also Krakoff, Settler Colonialism and 
Reclamation, supra note 2. 
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cultural futures.  For those futures to be tribal, however, some tie to a 
tribe’s pre-contact roots is necessary as are contemporary membership 
criteria that reflect the tribe’s own norms for inclusion.  Those can and do 
vary, with some tribes relying only on lineal descent from an historic group 
and others, like the Seminole and Miccosukee, requiring closer ties.194  
Tribal histories regarding their paths to federal recognition also make clear, 
however, that by the time a tribe achieves that status, its members already 
reflect a mix of identities—linguistic, ethnic, and otherwise.195  Tribes’ 
membership rules are therefore not “racial” in either a biological or a 
socially constructed sense, except insofar as they inevitably reflect the ways 
that tribes and Indians themselves were racialized by U.S. laws and 
policies.  The best, and perhaps only, way to reverse that process of 
subordination is to allow tribes today to define their members free from 
non-Indian constraint.  Leading Lakota intellectual and scholar Vine 
Deloria, Jr.  advocated a similar position when he remarked, “‘[b]efore the 
white man can relate to others he must forego the pleasure of defining 
them.’”196 
IV.  EQUAL PROTECTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW: DOING THE LEAST HARM 
As discussed in Part II, in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, the Supreme 
Court expressed “equal protection concerns” about the prospect of a child 
who was eligible for enrollment in an Indian tribe being unavailable for 
adoption to non-Indians.197  The Court’s several references to Baby 
Veronica’s “1.2%” Cherokee lineage give the impression that the Court’s 
concerns arose due to a perception that the child was not really Indian.198  
As the foregoing histories reveal, the recurring enemy to American Indian 
tribal existence has been non-Indian power to set the terms of their identity.  
If tribes could not be eliminated through disease and violence, then removal 
and containment might do the job.  When these policies failed to eradicate 
all tribes, efforts to assimilate them out of existence, including unilaterally 
imposing membership requirements, became a dominant strategy.199  More 
recently, during the era of termination, the Federal Government opted for 
ending the separate political status of tribes through a variety of legal 
 
194 While it is beyond the scope of this article to discuss in detail, tribes in the Southeast might 
have gravitated toward tighter membership requirements in response to a wave of non-Indians who 
claimed Indian identity for a variety of fraudulent or spurious purposes.  See MILLER, supra note 172, at 
8. 
195 See supra Part II; see also Inextricably Political, supra note 2. 
196 DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 93 (1991) (quoting Deloria, Jr.). 
197 See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2565 (2013). 
198 See id. at 2556. 
199 For more on allotment and assimilation policies and their relationship to racial formation in 
the Indian context, see Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1065-75. 
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mechanisms, a sublimely bureaucratic approach to eliminating tribes.  The 
Court, by questioning Baby Veronica’s Cherokee identity and intimating 
that it might be tantamount to an invidious racial classification, unwittingly 
echoes the logic and policies of American Indian elimination. 
Unguided judicial scrutiny of classifications that further the unique 
government-to-government relationship with American Indian tribes is 
more likely to perpetuate the subordination of Indian people than to reverse 
it.200  Instead of regressing in this way, the Court should adhere to Mancari.  
As the histories of the Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes indicate, federally 
recognized tribes are indeed political bodies, and their members are 
ethnically, linguistically, and even racially diverse, reflecting their varied 
histories of evolving from pre-contact peoples to present-day tribes.  
Further, the Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes’ federally recognized status 
depends not only on their ties to an aboriginal people, but equally on their 
political and strategic responses to policies of elimination.  Proving the 
point, the Independent Seminoles of Florida are just as indigenous as the 
Miccosukee and Seminole Tribes, but the Independent Seminoles have 
chosen not to seek federal recognition on cultural and political grounds.  
The distinction between the Independent Seminoles, and even among the 
Miccosukee and Seminole Tribes, is therefore political, not racial or ethnic, 
even while the composition of all of these groups also reflects both how 
U.S.  policies deployed race in the American Indian context, as well as the 
tribes’ continuing connection to their aboriginal roots. 
The Supreme Court’s constitutional concern in Adoptive Couple v. 
Baby Girl, to put it bluntly, is that questionable Indian ties will be used to 
gain strategic advantage in custody and adoption cases.201  In lower court 
cases, there is an analogous narrative emerging in the context of economic 
regulation.  In KG Urban Enterprises, LLC v. Patrick, a case percolating 
through the federal courts, a non-Indian gaming company challenged a 
Massachusetts law on equal protection grounds.202  The case is procedurally 
 
200 Under the Mancari framework, courts already have the tools to scrutinize legislation that 
discriminates against Indian people on the basis of their race, as well as to question federal legislation 
that does not further the government’s unique obligations to tribes.  The Court can also, under existing 
law, exercise its power of judicial review to nudge Congress to live up to its trust obligations.  See 
Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1122 n.490 (and sources cited therein).  That the Court does not 
do so, and in fact has regressed on this front in recent years, provides yet another reason to adhere to 
formulations that restrain the Court from unguided intermeddling. 
201 The Court says as much.  See 133 S. Ct. at 2565: 
[U]nder the State Supreme Court’s reading, the [ICWA] would put certain vulnerable children at a 
great disadvantage solely because an ancestor—even a remote one—was an Indian . . . .  [A] 
biological Indian father could abandon his child in utero and refuse any support for the birth 
mother . . . and then could play his ICWA trump card at the eleventh hour to override the mother’s 
decision and the child’s best interests. 
202 See KG Urban Enters. LLC v. Patrick, No. 11–12070–NMG, 2014 WL 108307 (Jan. 9, 2014), 
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complex, but the gist of KG Urban’s claim is that the law discriminates on 
the basis of race because it affords priorities to federally recognized tribes 
that, pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, might enter into a 
gaming compact with the State.203  So far, KG Urban has been losing on the 
merits, but its narrative of tribes as racial, as opposed to political groups, 
has crept into the courts’ discussions.  First, the district court rejected KG 
Urban’s equal protection claim on the grounds that Mancari controlled, but 
only after questioning Mancari’s reasoning and continuing relevance.  The 
district court described tribes as being composed of members who share 
“racial heritage,” and then mused that if it could do so, “it would treat 
Indian tribal status as a quasi-political, quasi-racial classification subject to 
varying levels of scrutiny depending on the authority making it and the 
interests at stake.”204  As I have discussed elsewhere, this multi-tiered 
approach would be a mistake.  It would license federal courts to impose 
stereotypical views on tribes, in particular the dated notion that tribes’ only 
legitimate projects pertain to land or culture.205  Fortunately, the district 
court could only engage in wishful thinking along these lines.  Constrained 
by Mancari, it ruled against KG Urban on its equal protection claim. 
The First Circuit largely affirmed the lower court’s decision to reject 
KG Urban’s claims, but revived a narrow version of KG Urban’s equal 
protection challenge, directing the district court to consider whether the 
Massachusetts law would violate KG Urban’s constitutional rights if the 
State’s waiting period for determining whether the Mashpee Tribe could 
meet the IGRA requirements was unduly long.206  On remand, the district 
court again rejected KG Urban’s equal protection claim, but accepted its 
framing of the question to be addressed: does the Massachusetts law, either 
expressly or as applied, discriminate on the basis of race by anticipating the 
possibility of a gaming compact with a federally recognized tribe?  The 
district court, throughout the opinion, equates mention of the Mashpee 
Tribe with possible evidence of “discriminatory intent.”207  In the end the 
district court found no evidence of such intent, but it skipped entirely over 
an important threshold question: why should a state law that treats federally 
recognized tribes in distinct ways in the economic context be analyzed 
through the lens of racial discrimination?  Such state laws may or may not 
be good policy; they may or may not be rational.  But states are generally 
 
on remand from 693 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012). 
203 See KG Urban Enters., LLC, v. Patrick, 693 F.3d 1, 12 (2012). 
204 KG Urban Enters., LLC v. Patrick, 839 F. Supp. 2d 388, 404 (D. Mass. 2012) aff’d in part, 
vacated and remanded in part, 693 F.3d 1. 
205 See Inextricably Political, supra note 2, at 1127-28. 
206 See 693 F.3d at 24-28. 
207 See KG Urban Enters., LLC, 2014 WL 108307 at *9-10. 
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given wide leeway to make distinctions between economic actors without 
being subject to heightened judicial scrutiny.  One problem for the district 
court was some confusion in the First Circuit opinion concerning when 
states, as opposed to the Federal Government, can enact legislation that 
affects tribes.208  That line of cases has generally addressed state legislation 
that has intruded into tribal sovereign powers.209  States lack the authority to 
pass laws that impinge on tribal inherent powers, and this has been true 
since Chief Justice John Marshall penned Worcester v. Georgia.210  If states 
pass laws that accommodate tribes as governments, including as 
governments with inherent power to engage in economic activity, it may 
well be the case that other economic actors are disadvantaged, but that 
disadvantage is not a result of racial discrimination by the State.  Yet if KG 
Urban and its lawyer, Paul Clement, have their way, that is the approach 
that the Supreme Court may someday consider. 
In Adoptive Couple, the Court implicitly disparaged Cherokee 
membership rules because they define too many people as “Indian” in a 
way that deprives them of the opportunity to be adopted out to white 
families.  In KG Urban, the district court assumed that treating a tribe 
differently from other economic groups was the same as “discriminating on 
the basis of race.”  These cases indicate that the effort to equate, in the 
public mind, classifications that further the political independence of tribes 
with invidious racial classifications has been succeeding.  This effort 
resonates disturbingly with the ways that Indian tribes and people have been 
racialized throughout our history.  The stereotypical Indian is dressed in 
traditional garb, lives in harmony with nature (or, in the negative version, is 
a savage of the wilderness), and has an ethereal (or wicked) and, in either 
case, largely silent demeanor.  Anything other than this “full blood” vision 
is not truly Indian.  The narrative of the disappearing full-blooded Indian 
justified severing Indians from their land and resources, and facilitated non-
Indian settlement.211 The flip side of this is that today’s tribes, especially if 
they engage in mainstream economic activity, are not really “tribes,” but 
amalgams of racially-related opportunists getting a leg up on non-Indian 
competition.  Both stereotypes should be rejected, and at a minimum, 
should not undergird doctrinal shifts that would allow for subjective judicial 
review of classifications that, finally in recent times, have aimed to reverse 
our sorry history of attempts to eliminate Indian tribes and people. 
 
208 See 693 F.3d at 19-23. 
209 See Washington v. Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463 (1979). 
210 See 31 U.S. 515 (1832). 
211 For more on the broad deployment of Native stereotypes throughout American legal thought, 
see ROBERT WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT (1992). 
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CONCLUSION 
Florida’s American Indian tribes, like all American Indian tribes, are 
political entities that evolved from pre-contact peoples to governments 
recognized under United States law.  The classification “federally 
recognized tribe” is political, at a minimum, because it reflects that process.  
For the Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes, the long road to federal 
recognition included evolving from pre-contact and Creek peoples to a 
people distinctly known as Seminole, and then resisting repeated (and often 
violent) efforts to eliminate them from the State.  That today there are three 
federally recognized tribes composed of Seminole people (two in Florida 
and one in Oklahoma) and one unrecognized tribe is further evidence that 
the distinctions among, and between tribes, are political.  The Seminole 
people in all four tribes have much in common linguistically and culturally, 
but political and strategic responses to efforts to eliminate them resulted in 
the tribes’ different statuses and geographies.  Finally, the Seminole Tribes, 
like all tribes, have members who derive from a variety of ethnic and 
cultural backgrounds.  Tribes, and especially federally recognized tribes, are 
political in all of these senses. 
Federally recognized tribes, including the Seminole and Miccosukee 
Tribes of Florida, are required by federal law to have membership rules.  
Those rules reflect the tribes priorities with respect to maintaining their 
cohesiveness as a group, perpetuating their norms and customs, and 
encouraging participation in governance, among other factors.  The 
Seminole and Miccosukee Tribes meet these goals through membership 
criteria that require relatively close familial ties to tribal members (at least 
one grandparent, in the case of Seminole, and a mother, in the case of 
Miccosukee), as well as acceptance by the Tribe.  Other tribes, like the 
Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, have opted for more expansive membership 
rules, requiring only lineal descent from certain census rolls.  Regardless of 
the form, membership criteria are political expressions of the tribe’s 
priorities for perpetuating itself as a distinct people.  Further, because ties to 
an aboriginal people are required for federal recognition, tribes may have to 
include at least lineal descent from an historic group to maintain their 
separate status. 
To summarize, the classification “federally recognized tribe” is 
political, and tribes’ membership rules are political.  Today, our laws and 
policies reflect the overdue priority of supporting tribes as independent, 
self-governing sovereigns.  But those policies risk being undermined by the 
judicial branch if its bout of “constitutional concern” gets any worse, and it 
licenses judicial review of laws that further the government’s unique 
obligations to tribes.  Perhaps telling the Seminole story will make some bit 
of difference.  For those who are not optimists about influencing the Court, 
KRAKOFF_PUBLISHER (DO NOT DELETE) 10/18/2014  1:23 PM 
330 FIU Law Review [Vol. 9:295 
a larger solace is that the Seminole—the Unconquered People—will surely 
find a way to survive nonetheless. 
 
